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FINANCIAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND 
BUSINESS CYCLES* 
BRUCE C. GREENWALD AND JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 
Because of financial market imperfections, such as those generated by asymmet- 
ric information in financial markets, which lead to breakdowns in markets, like that 
for equity, in which risks are shared, firms act in a risk-averse manner. The 
resulting macroeconomic model accounts for many widely observed aspects of 
actual business cycles: (a) cyclical movements in real product wages, (b) cyclical 
patterns of output and investment including inventories, (c) sensitivity of the 
economy to small perturbations, and (d) persistence. More downward flexibility in 
wages and prices may exacerbate the plight of an economy that is in a deep 
recession. 
This paper describes a simple model of macroeconomic fluc- 
tuations based upon the kinds of informational imperfections that 
are chiefly related to adverse selection and moral hazard and that 
have received substantial attention in the recent microeconomic 
literature. A major consequence of these informational imperfec- 
tions already studied extensively in connection with insurance, 
labor, and financial markets is that they interfere with the proper 
distribution of risk among economic agents. In extreme cases, 
markets for sharing risk may break down completely. 
The fact that firms can only partially diversify out of the risks 
that they face leads them to act in a risk-averse manner. This has 
two important implications. (1) In making all of their economic 
decisions-investment, production, and pricing-they take into 
account the risk consequences. (2) Firms' willingness to undertake 
risks is affected both by their total net worth and their stock of 
liquid assets, which can quickly be converted into cash. These asset 
balances can act as buffer stocks to absorb risks. 
The various decisions that the firm makes are obviously 
interrelated: a general theory requires a portfolio approach to firm 
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decision making which takes the various correlations into ac- 
count.' This paper is more modest in its ambition. We focus our 
attention on how risk considerations affect firms' production 
decisions. We argue that changes in firms' perceptions of the risks 
which they face and in their net worth position can have potentially 
large effects on their willingness to produce. The shifts in one 
firm's supply curve get translated into shifts in the demand curves 
facing other firms, and through this mechanism shocks to one 
agent in the economy get transmitted to others. 
We derive a risk-based aggregate supply curve, which leads to 
the kind of persistence frequently observed in macroeconomic time 
series, and may even generate business fluctuations whose charac- 
teristics bear a striking resemblance to those observed. 
In emphasizing problems of risk distribution, this paper can be 
thought of as continuing the line of research initiated by Kalecki 
[19391. Our paper, however, is based on the microfoundations 
provided by recent work on financial markets with imperfect 
information, and attempts to integrate that approach into other, 
more recent macroeconomic traditions.2 
The central role of information imperfections is to restrict a 
firm's ability to raise equity funds in external capital markets. The 
empirical evidence suggests that firms simply do not resort to 
equity markets for raising working capital; overall, new equity 
issues represent a small fraction of capital raised by firms. (In 
recent years, net equity issues have actually been negative both in 
the United States and United Kingdom [Mayer, 1990].) There is 
good reason for this: new equity issues normally have a large 
negative effect on the value of outstanding shares [Asquith and 
Mullins, 1986]. And these negative effects on market value have, in 
1. For a beginning of such a theory, see Greenwald and Stiglitz [1989]. 
2. This paper is thus in the same spirit as that of Bernanke and Gertler [1989], 
as well as both older [Kuh and Meyer, 1959] and more recent [Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Peterson, 1988; Hubbard, 1990] work emphasizing the importance of cash flow and 
balance sheet variables in determining investment. Also see Lindbeck [1963]. 
Within the macroeconomics literature Hicks [1988] (see Klamer [1989]) shortly 
before his death, recanted on the IS-LM framework that he had introduced and 
argued in favor of the kind of model that we have attempted to develop here. Other 
macroeconomists who have taken similar positions (without developing the kind of 
formal model presented here) include Leijonhufvud [1968] and Minsky [1975]. 
Our work differs from the Bernanke and Gertler analysis in the explanation of 
the source of the limitations on equity markets (they employ the costly state 
verification model; for a critique of that model, see Hart [1990]). The macroeco- 
nomic model that they construct appears heavily dependent on their specific 
formulation. The model presented here is constructed to illustrate the general 
properties of aggregate behavior in economies with risk-averse firms with limited 
recourse to equity (for whatever reason). 
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turn, been explained in terms of adverse selection, moral hazard, 
and signaling models.3 
Because we are concerned in this paper with exploring the 
macroeconomic implications of these financial constraints, we 
simplify by assuming that firms cannot raise new equity, and that 
they always pay a fixed dividend on existing shares.4 At the same 
time, in order to separate the risk distribution issues that are at the 
heart of the model from traditional credit restriction questions, we 
assume that there is a perfect loan market. The output decisions of 
firms are assumed to be made by managers who are averse to the 
possibility of bankruptcy.5 Finally, we assume that futures mar- 
kets do not exist and inputs must be paid for significantly before 
outputs are sold.6 Thus, any decision to produce is inherently a 
risky investment decision. 
3. For formal models of this phenomenon see Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss 
[1984] and Myers and Majluf [1984]. The basic argument is that if the managers of 
firms, who are better informed about a firm's future prospects than equity investors 
at large, are willing to issue stock at the current market price, then "outside" 
investors ought to be unwilling to buy at that price. Hence, an equity issue 
announcement ought to be associated with a decline in a firm's current stock price 
which should in turn inhibit equity issues. Agency considerations reinforce these 
arguments. 
Shleifer [1986] has argued that, in addition, there is evidence that the market 
as a whole acts in a risk-averse manner; i.e., firms face downward sloping demand 
curves for their securities. For a theoretical model consistent with this observation, 
see Stiglitz [1972, 1989b]. 
4. The latter assumption, like the assumption of no (or limited) equity issues, 
can be justified as an approximation to a long-standing stylized fact: there is a large 
empirical literature, datingback at least to Lintner [1971] showing that firms adjust 
dividends relatively rarely. This behavior can also be related to information 
problems: reducing dividends is taken to be a very negative signal of the firm's 
prospects, having a correspondingly large negative effect on the firm's market value 
(see Bhattacharya [1979]). 
In this paper the catastrophe facing the firm that we model is that it is not able 
to pay back its debts and accordingly it goes into bankruptcy. We could have, as well, 
modeled the catastrophe as that the firm is not able to maintain its dividends, and 
accordingly must reduce or eliminate them, with a correspondingly disastrous effect 
on market value. The analysis is the same, whatever the interpretation one takes. 
5. The justification for this kind of assumption is again informational. When a 
firm becomes financially distressed, it is usually impossible to tell whether this is 
due to bad luck with projects that were a priori properly undertaken or to bad 
management. Thus, managers will inevitably suffer a stigma associated with 
financial distress. Concepts like "financial distress" and "bankruptcy," while they 
have a clear intuitive meaning, are difficult to define precisely, at least in general 
terms. In the model presented below, they take on well-defined meanings. See, e.g., 
Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz [1986]. 
6. Again, this assumption rests ultimately on informational failures, typically 
associated with product quality and terms of delivery, which inhibit the develop- 
ment and use of future markets. In practice, futures markets are far from complete. 
A relatively small proportion of goods in our economy are "made to order," and 
even when they are, there remains a positive probability of default; that is, that the 
firm placing the order does not fulfill its contract. In most cases where goods are 
produced to order, a relatively small fraction of the payment is made by the 
purchaser up front. This, in turn, can be related to informational problems: the 
chance that the producer will default on his part of the bargain. 
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I. THE BASIC AGGREGATE SUPPLY QUANDARY AND THE RISK 
RESOLUTION: HEURISTICS 
Standard competitive economic theory argues that, in the 
absence of risk, firms produce up to the point where price P equals 
marginal costs. If we assume aggregate output q is a function of 
labor 1 alone, then 
(1) q =1(l), 4)' > O. < 0 
and we obtain 
(2) P = WM), 
where X is the (nominal) wage. If we divide both sides by P, define 
w/P = w as the real wage, and note that w/1I' = marginal cost of 
production (in real terms). Equation (2) can be rewritten as 
(2') 1=w/V =MC. 
Equation (2) implies that as the economy goes into a recession, 
1 is reduced significantly, and accordingly real wages should rise 
significantly (see Figure Ia). The fact that they do not was an early 
objection raised to Keynes's use of the competitive supply model. 
Previous attempts to reconcile the data with the theory have taken 
three forms. 
1. The production function is made a function of time, so that 
Q MPL( 12) =slope MPL( )=slope 
output Production 
Function 
/ ~ ~I I 
l 2 l1 L employment 
FIGURE Ia 
With a given technology a reduction in employment from 11 to 12 is associated 
with an increase in the marginal product of labor. In competitive labor and product 
markets this means that real wages should rise. 
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while 1 was reduced, there was technical regress which reduced the 
marginal productivity of labor (see Figure Ib). This view, popular- 
ized by the real business cycle literature, is both on its face 
implausible, and has a number of other counterfactual implica- 
tions. See Mankiw [1989] or Greenwald and Stiglitz [1988a]. 
2. The data do not accurately reflect the real (product) wage 
that is relevant for the theory. This is the view taken by the implicit 
contract literature; but this literature argues that in a recession 
observed real wages are actually higher than "shadow" real wages, 
exacerbating the quandary. Moreover, much of the standard data 
refer to average wages, while what is relevant for the theory is 
marginal wages, i.e., taking into account overtime. Real marginal 
wages in booms exceed those in recessions by more than the 
conventional data suggest, again making the quandary more 
puzzling. 
3. Most markets are imperfectly competitive, and so we must 
replace (2) with 
(2") P 1 - (1In 
where - is the elasticity of demand. If the elasticity of demand is 
output MPL( L,) =slope 




Real business cycle theory explains the apparent lack of variability in real 
product wages by assuming technological regress. The downward movement in the 
production function lowers the marginal product of labor, just offsetting the effect 
of the reduced employment. 
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lower in a recession, then firms' markups will increase.7 But there 
is little evidence for the marked changes in demand elasticities over 
the cycle that would be required, and indeed, some have argued 
that markets become even more competitive (elasticities become 
higher) in recessions, as collusive arrangements break down (see 
Rotemberg and Saloner [1987]).8 
We argue that as firms produce more, they must bear more 
risk. We focus on a model with bankruptcy in which as firms 
produce more, the probability of bankruptcy increases. Bankruptcy 
is costly, and firms take these costs into account in their production 
decisions. Thus, we replace (1) by the equation, 
(3) P= /V +MBC, 
where MBC is the marginal bankruptcy cost.9 
Alternatively, we can divide by P and thus replace (2') with 
(3') 1 = w/' + p, 
where p equals real marginal bankruptcy costs. 
Given p and w, (3') defines the equilibrium output of the firm. 
In Figure II we have drawn the marginal costs of production, 
ignoring bankruptcy, and then added to that the marginal bank- 
ruptcy cost. Production occurs at the level of output where price 
equals marginal cost of production (including bankruptcy costs). 
By plotting the value of output corresponding to different values of 
P. we can translate (3) into an aggregate supply schedule, as in 
Figure MIb. The problem posed earlier can be put: since real wages 
seem to vary so little over the business cycle, how can we account 
for the large changes in output? The real business cycle school 
claims that the aggregate supply schedule shifts to the left because 
of technological regress. We claim that the aggregate supply 
schedule shifts because the marginal bankruptcy risk increases. In 
the next section we show why this is so, by constructing a model 
that allows us to calculate explicitly this marginal bankruptcy cost. 
7. For a survey of alternative imperfect competition models, see Stiglitz [1984]. 
For an econometic study arguing that price exceeds marginal costs, see Hall [1988]. 
He attributes the discrepancy to imperfect competition, but his empirical findings 
are equally consistent with the theory that we develop here. 
8. Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss [1984] explain why with a Phelps-Winter 
[1970] imperfect competition model and imperfect capital markets, we would expect 
cyclical movements in markups. For other models in which changes in the cost of 
capital have a direct effect on markups, see Stiglitz [1989a]. 
9. Our theory works equally well with imperfect competition, in which case we 
replace (3) with 
P(1 - 1/n) = w/'F' + MBC. 
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Panel A. Without bankruptcy firms produce up to the point where price equals 
marginal cost of production, )/F'. With bankruptcy the marginal costs of 
bankruptcy must be taken into account. 
Panel B. Without bankruptcy the aggregate supply curve is given by q = 
F@F'-1(w/P)). Shifts in the supply curve must be related to shifts in (. With 
bankruptcy the aggregate supply curve is the solution to 1 = wAY' + p. Shifts in p, 
the marginal bankruptcy cost, give rise to shifts in the aggregate supply curve. 
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II. FIRM BEHAVIOR AND AGGREGATE SUPPLY 
Firms, identified by an index i = 1, . .. , I, will be assumed to 
make decisions at discrete intervals: t = 1,... , T. At the beginning 
of each period a firm inherits both a nominal level of debt, Br_, and 
the previous period's output, qit1. We assume that there is a 
one-period lag between the use (and payment) of inputs and the 
availability of output. Thus, qt-1 results from production decisions 
made at the beginning of period t - 1, but becomes available for 
sale only at the beginning of period t. For simplicity, we assume 
also that output is perishable and q- 1 must all be sold at the 
beginning of period t. We assume that the nominal debt B', was 
incurred at the beginning of period t - 1 in order to pay for the 
inputs that were required for producing qi 1. Associated with this 
debt is a nominal contractual rate of interest R'_, determined at 
that time. Thus, nominal contractual repayments owed to debt- 
holders by firm i on entering period t are (1 + Rn_1) B>. 
At the beginning of period t competitive goods markets open 
and clear. This determines the price Pt at which firm i sells its 
inherited output q>*,. The price Pt also determines the nominal 
equity position of firm i at the beginning of period t since 
(4) A' Nominal Equity Position of firm i at the beginning of 
period t 
Ptqt-> - (1 + R>-l)Bt-1. 
The level of A' then determines the solvency of firm i. For some 
level of At sufficiently low (or negative), firm i would presumably be 
declared bankrupt and reorganized with appropriately negative 
consequences for the managers (or owners, if owner-managed) of 
the firm. For simplicity, we shall assume that A' < 0 implies 
bankruptcy, although a nonzero (either positive or negative) 
threshold could have been used without fundamentally altering the 
implications of the model.'0 
We assume that firms face a real wage w and at that wage, they 
can hire as much labor as they wish. We also assume that firms can 
borrow as much as they want, but at terms which must yield the 
lender an expected real return of rt. The expected real return rt 
then determines the terms at which loans will be made available to 
individual firms, typically a schedule relating R' to q' and At for a 
10. The comparative static analysis of a bankruptcy threshold below zero is 
more complicated than that of a zero or positive threshold. 
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given expected real return and expected rate of inflation. Combined 
with expectations concerning future output prices and At, these 
factor prices lead managers to select a level of output, qt. which, 
once workers have been paid, leads to a level of debt, B', and a 
contractual nominal return, R', that firm i inherits at the begin- 
ning of period t + 1, when the entire process is repeated. 
Within this temporal context we shall make the following 
assumptions. 
Al. Firms produce output using only labor as an input with It = 
Wqt), where 4) is a labor requirements function11 with 4)' > 0 
and 4)" ? 0. 
A2. The price level Pt faced by an individual firm is determined by a 
sectoral random variable [4 and the overall price level Pt, 
where 
(5) Pt = a'Ptg E (at) = 1 
and Ct, the relative price of the output of firm i, is i.i.d. with a 
distribution function F(-), and density f (). 
A3. If A' < 0, firms go "bankrupt," and the entire proceeds from 
the sale of q'_1 are distributed without further loss to debt- 
holders (i.e., there are no reorganization or liquidation costs to 
debtholders).12 
Firms borrow to supplement initial equity to pay production 
costs. Since the real wage is wt, nominal wage payments are 
Ptwt4)(q'), and 
(6) B' = Ptwt4)(q') - A' 
Given A2 and A3, lenders to firm i at the beginning of period t 
earn returns that are a random variable whose value is resolved 
only when prices are revealed at the beginning of period t + 1. 
Firms go bankrupt if what they promise to pay exceeds their 
11. + could, of course, easily be made to vary across firms. However, doing this 
would merely complicate the notation without significantly altering the impli- 
cations of the model. Note that -1r is a production function of the usual sort; i.e., 
<t>i =_ (D.) 
12. Introducing reorganization costs has an impact on the results similar, but 
not quite identical, to the effect of a negative bankruptcy threshold. Also with 
reorganization costs firms will have an additional incentive (beyond the managerial 
penalty) to avoid bankruptcy. 
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income; that is, when (using (4) and A3) 
(1 + R')B' > Pt+lqt 
or, using (5) and (6), 
IPt wt~4)(qi) - a (7) Of < (1 + RI)) _ t+1 
where 
at -- tAPt _real equity level of firm i at the beginning of period t 
and 
Ut+1 is the level of relative price in period t + 1 
at which firm i is just solvent. 
If the firm i cannot meet its debt obligations, its total income ptq' is 
divided equally among debtors. Thus, using (5) and (6), real 
returns to lenders are 
P- ) (1 + Rt ) if >~l 
(8) (1+ R t)(+ |_____._i _._ 
Wt+4(q') - a' if it+1 
< 
i4t+1 
Strictly speaking, Pt+,, looking forward from the beginning of 
period t, is a random variable. However, in order to simplify the 
exposition, we assume for the moment that there is relatively little 
uncertainty about future price levels (as opposed to the relative 
sectoral prices Pt+1) and, thus, that13 
(9) Pt+1 Pe1 Expected price level at the beginning of period 
t + 1 looking forward from the beginning of period t. 
Given equation (9), the expected real return to lenders to firm i in 
13. This assumption may appear extreme. However, it can be relaxed without 
affecting the conclusions of the model in any fundamental way. Unfortunately, the 
price of such relaxation is considerable notational complexity since it requires 
definition of a bivariate price distribution covering both aggregate and sectoral 
prices; hence the use of the present assumption. 
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period t is 
(10) E[(1 + R)]( = (1 + Rt) 
/+ t+pe 
x (1 F(-u1) + fut+lx dF(x), 
wt~4(q) - at 0 
where Pe+1 can now be substituted for Pt+1 in the expression for 
ui.+1 The first expression on the right-hand side of equation (10) 
represents the expected real return to lenders from those situa- 
tions in which firm i is solvent in period t + 1. The second 
expression then represents the expected real return to lenders from 
situations in which firm i is insolvent in period t + 1. For 
determining the appropriate contractual rate of return, R', we next 
assume that 
A4. Lenders are perfectly informed14 and risk neutral, which 
implies that 
(11) E[1 + = 1 + rt, 
where rt is the tth period real interest rate. 
Equations (7) and (11) can be solved for the equilibrium level 
of the contractual nominal interest rate R', and the solvency 
relative price, i+4, as functions of qt, a', wt, rt, and Ptlpte+.15 
14. Clearly, for the informational imperfections that interfere with the issue of 
equity to exist, lenders must not be able to use their information to purchase equity. 
The best way to interpret A4 is that lending is done through institutions that are 
legally enjoined from purchasing stock. In any event, imperfect information on the 
part of lenders would intensify rather than alleviate the problems embodied in the 
model. 




wte,(q;) - aV (1 - Ut + x 
The term in brackets is just a function of uii+1, J(iui+). Rearranging, we have 
J(ut+,) = (1 + rt)( Wt ) - a) 
or 
= 
-1 ((1 + rt)(wt4(qt) - at) 
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(12) R= R'(q',aWt'ptpe+ll + rt), 
u1= u Il wt~ptlpte + rt). 
Then, substitution from (12) into F(u) yields 
Probability of Bankruptcy - F[1u+,(q',aw 191 + rt)] 
giving the probability of bankruptcy as a function of the decision 
variable qt, the state variable at, and the parameters wt (wages), 
Pt/Pe+1 (the expected change in the price level), and rt (the real 
interest rate). 
In deciding upon a level of output, we shall assume that the 
objectives of a firm's managers are described by the assumption 
that 
A5. Firms select q' in order to maximize expected real profits (i.e., 
total sales revenues minus repayment to lenders) minus an 
expected real cost of bankruptcy; i.e., 
(13) max (1p / )E[Pt+lqt - (1 + R&)(Ptwt4(q') - At)] 
where c' is the cost incurred in the event of bankruptcy and 
F(u-d1) is the probability of bankruptcy. 
Equation (13) is a simple way of capturing the hypothesis that 
firms act to avoid bankruptcy. As we shall see, this bankruptcy 
avoidance behavior induces a kind of risk aversion;16 similar results 
obtain whether these bankruptcy costs are viewed as real (manage- 
rial) reorganization costs associated with bankruptcy or if we view 
firms as maximizing the expected utility of profits with the utility 
function characterized by a declining marginal utility of profits and 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (see Greenwald and Stiglitz 
[1987]). 
and 
1 + Ri = -1 ((1 + rt)(wt,)(q') - at) )P+l qi t 
~~qi Pt wt,+(qt) - at 
16. Strictly speaking, this is true only if ctF is appropriately convex in q' and if 
at is not too small. See below and the appendix to Greenwald and Stiglitz [1988b]. 
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We assume further that 
A6. Bankruptcy costs increase with the level of a firm's output: 
(14) ci = cqi. 
This assumption is made largely for analytic reasons; similar 
results hold for other bankruptcy cost functions as long as expected 
bankruptcy costs are convex in qt. There are, however, three 
economic justifications which suggest that A6 represents a plausi- 
ble simplification. First, as firms become larger, they presumably 
involve more managers whose loss of position, income, and power 
in the event of insolvency is likely to increase. Bankruptcy should, 
therefore, be a more serious matter for General Motors than for a 
local grocery store. Since q' is the only scale variable in the model, 
having bankruptcy costs increase with q' is the only way to capture 
these scale effects. Second, a significant role of managers is 
choosing a level of output (in the model this is their only role). 
Bankruptcy with high levels of output should reflect unfavorably 
on their ability to do this. Since bankruptcy in this model is due to 
low prices, a high level of output in the face of these low prices may, 
retrospectively at least, imply unusually bad judgment by manag- 
ers and may thus be unusually costly to their future prospects. 
Third, having bankruptcy costs depend on q' is necessary in order 
to ensure that the possibility of bankruptcy is never ignored. If 
there were a fixed cost of bankruptcy independent of the level of 
output, then profits, which are increasing in output, may grow so 
large relative to bankruptcy costs that bankruptcy becomes a 
negligible consideration.17 Since the purpose of this paper is to 
investigate the macroeconomic implications of conditions in which 
managers (or owners) are penalized for bad outcomes and are 
affected by the possibility of these penalties, Assumption A6 is a 
convenient way of ensuring that these conditions are met. More- 
over, with the addition of fixed bankruptcy costs, there are 
reasonable circumstances under which the fundamental implica- 
tions of the model continue to hold. 18 
17. In any case, we must assume that there is an upper limit on output (or that 
+' increases sufficiently rapidly) and the bankruptcy costs coefficient c is sufficiently 
large that a maximum for the objective function in A5 exists. These technical 
assumptions are discussed in the appendix to Greenwald and Stiglitz [1988b]. 
18. The implied restriction in A5 to a single-period horizon is a matter of 
expositional convenience. The multiperiod maximization problem as well as the 
consequences of fixed bankruptcy costs are examined in Greenwald and Stiglitz 
[1988b]. 
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Given A2 and A4, the objective function of A5 can be written as 
(15) max [qt - (1 + rt)(wt4(qi) - a') - ciF(u+ 
qt 
Under these assumptions, a firm's real output is, therefore, 
determined by real wages, real interest rates, real equity holdings, 
and relative price uncertainty. The first-order condition1s for an 
interior maximum can now be written as 
(16) 1 - (1 + rt)wt(' = Pt. 
where pi is the marginal bankruptcy cost of firm i in period t; i.e., 
(17) Pt dqJF + ctf( t+1) dq 
If p were zero, equation (16) would be the standard result that 
employment should be increased to the point where the marginal 
product (1/4') equals the wage, taking into account the fact that 
the wage is paid the period before the output is received (and hence 
in present value terms, viewed at the time output is sold, wage 
costs are wt(1 + rt)). Equivalently, price (here, normalized at 
unity) is set equal to marginal costs ((1 + rt)wt4'). Since p is 
positive, the impact of bankruptcy risks is to restrict output; these 
risks drive a wedge between expected prices and marginal costs in 
the traditional sense. 
More importantly, the variables on the left-hand side of 
equation (16)-real interest rates, real wages, and technology- 
have historically shown substantial stability over time, changing 
only slowly at relatively predictable rates. In contrast, the variables 
that affect the right-hand side of equation (16)-such as the 
financial position of firms, at, and the degree of uncertainty 
concerning future prices (i.e., the distribution function F)-may 
change rapidly and unpredictably. It is these variables, many of 
which may be difficult to observe, that account for cyclical fluctua- 
tions in the model. 
Figure III depicts the solution to (16) graphically. Taking 
output as our numeraire, for small q, price is just equal to marginal 
cost, since p = 0. As q increases, so does p. Price exceeds marginal 
cost by the amount of the marginal bankruptcy costs. 
19. There are several restrictions that have to be imposed to ensure that the 
second-order conditions are satisfied. These are discussed in the appendix to 
Greenwald and Stiglitz [1988b]. 
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FIGURE III 
Determination of Equilibrium Output and Employment 
A decrease in equity or an increase in perceived risk increases the marginal 
bankruptcy cost; p increases to p, leading output to fall. 
A. The Determinants of Marginal Bankruptcy Risk and 
Individual Firm Supply 
An increase in the real wage or real interest rate has two 
effects: the direct effect on the left-hand side of (16), and the 
indirect effect of increasing the marginal bankruptcy cost, at each 
level of output. The higher real wage means that the firm must 
borrow more to produce any given level of output, and the higher 
real interest rate means that the firm must pay back more (on 
average) for any amount it borrows. Both effects lead to reduced 
equilibrium output. Thus, it is easy to derive the labor demand or 
the output supply curve. 
The marginal bankruptcy cost pi depends, of course, on the 
level of output. In addition, it is a function of the real wage, the real 
intres raethe level of equity of the firm (a') as well as the 
subjective probability distribution of the random variable u+.We 
can thus represent the supply function of a firm (the solution to 
(16)) and its demand curve for labor by an equation of the form, 
(18) qt = gi(wtrtaivc) 
It='I(qt) = )(g1(wt,rta',v1)), 
FIGUR III 
92 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
where vt represents a measure of the riskiness of the distribution F. 
g' < 0: real wage increases depress supply; 
g' < 0: real interest rate increases depress supply. 
Our main concern, however, is with the effect of equity levels and 
uncertainty (risk) on production. It is possible to verify 
PROPOSITION 1. The higher the level of equity, the lower the 
marginal bankruptcy cost (risk premium) pt, and hence the 
higher the level of production. 
PROPOSITION 2. Increases in the degree of uncertainty result in an 
increase in the marginal bankruptcy cost (risk premium) and 
hence in a lower level of investment.20 
Under the assumption that 4) is linear, up to a capacity 
constraint, we can show that production, as a function of the equity 
level a', appears as in Figure IV. For the range within which the 
constant returns assumption holds, the elasticity of supply with 
respect to firm equity is unity.21 
Accordingly, 
PROPOSITION 3. At least near the capacity level, output is a concave 
function of equity levels. 
These three propositions are the heart of the analysis. Proposi- 
tion 1 implies that, if for some reason, a firm's equity is reduced 
(e.g., because the prices at which the firm is able to sell its goods are 
lower than anticipated) then, in subsequent periods, the firm's 
output will be reduced. Diagrammatically in Figure III a reduction 
of equity increases p, reducing output from q0 to q1. 
Moreover, our analysis suggests that for high leverage econo- 
mies, the output multipliers associated with equity injections may 
be substantial. For example, if, in equilibrium, equity represents 
one third of total capital (which in this circulating capital world is 
slightly less than output), then with constant returns to scale a $1 
increase in equity will yield $3 of increased output. Note that there 
are a variety of ways that such equity injections may occur, most 
20. The precise meaning of increases in uncertainty and the conditions under 
which Proposition 2 is valid are discussed in the appendix to Greenwald and Stiglitz 
[1988b]. 
21. More generally, with diminishing returns the elasticity of supply is less 
than or equal to unity. This is, of course, a partial-equilibrium result. To the extent 
that increases in a lead to increases in labor demand, and these increases lead to 
wage increases, the net effect on output will be smaller. 
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FIGURE IV 
Firm output increases with firm equity, up to capacity. The reduction in 
output from a reduction in equity by A exceeds that gain in output from an 
increase in equity by A. 
importantly larger than anticipated increases in prices, whether a 
result of monetary or fiscal policy, can result in substantial 
increases in the equity base of firms.22 
Later, we shall show the not surprising result that losses in 
equity will not instantaneously be restored, and thus the model has 
the immediate implications of persistence; a loss of equity at time t 
results in lower output, not only at time t, but in subsequent 
periods as well. 
Proposition 2 means that a sudden change in perception 
concerning the uncertainty of future prices will be translated 
directly into a contraction in production. In Figure III the marginal 
22. In the model of this paper, sales at t are fixed, and thus the only source of 
variability in equity is prices (see equation (4)). If, on average, costs including 
interest payments represent 90 percent of the value of sales, a mere 5 percent 
reduction in sales price from the expected level translates into a 50 percent 
reduction in equity from its expected level, and a correspondingly large reduction in 
output. In a more general model, with firms selling out of inventory, and with prices 
possibly being chosen by firms, levels of demand have a direct effect on firms' 
financial positions. 
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bankruptcy cost rises from p to p, and output is accordingly 
reduced. 
The fact that the output function is concave (Proposition 3) 
means that redistributions of wealth within the production sector 
may have deleterious consequences for production. Thus, unantici- 
pated increases in prices (say oil) may have negative effects, and, at 
the same time, unanticipated decreases in prices of the same 
commodity may have negative effects. The oil price shocks increase 
the real equity of oil producers and decrease that of oil users. 
Figure IV illustrates that the reduction in output of the firm losing 
equity (equity goes from a* to a* - A) is greater than an increase in 
output of the firm with increased equity (equity goes from a* to 
a* + A). Average output of the two firms falls from q* before the 
disturbance to q2 afterwards. More generally, the magnitude of the 
fall in output is greater the greater is the disturbance and the 
greater is the curvature of gi* Propositions 2 and 3 together imply 
that increased uncertainty, both ex ante (anticipated) and ex post, 
depresses production. This will be true whether the uncertainty is 
due to concerns about real shocks or to concerns regarding the 
instabilities of macroeconomic policy including monetary policy. 
B. Aggregate Supply 
An aggregate supply function can be derived straightforwardly 
by summing the supply functions of individual firms. For simplic- 
ity, we assume that all firms have the same production function (4) 
and face the same uncertainty (F). We can then write aggregate 
output as 
qt = #(wt,rt,a1,... ;v). 
We can approximate the expression by taking a Taylor series 
expansion around the average level of firm equity holdings, at, 
(under our symmetry assumptions), giving us an aggregate supply 
function of the form, 
qt= g(wtrt,at;vo), 
where U2 is the variance of firm equity levels. The comparative 
static properties of this aggregate supply function will, in general, 
mirror those of a representative firm's output (with the additional 
effect noted that an increase in the dispersion of equity ownership 
will generally lower output). Thus, Figure V shows the aggregate 
demand for labor (which can be directly translated into an aggre- 
gate supply of goods). The curve shifts with changes in a, v, or a: 
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The aggregate demand for labor shifts down as a result of a reduction in a, an 
increase in perceived risk, and an increase in the dispersion of equity. 
decreases in average equity, increases in its dispersion, or increased 
perception of risk all shift the demand for labor curve or the output 
supply curve to the left. 
III. CLOSING THE MODEL: COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
To explore the implications of this new aggregate supply curve, 
we need to embed it in a model of the economy. To highlight the 
central features of our theory of the risk-averse firm, we wish to 
model the rest of the economy in standard ways. In this section we 
present a competitive equilibrium model, in which the labor 
market always clears. In the next we present an efficiency wage 
model. 
In order to embed the supply function of the previous section 
in a model which is as simple as possible, we assume that consumer 
behavior can be described by the behavior of a single, infinitely 
lived representative consumer. Furthermore, we shall assume that 
this representative consumer may borrow and lend freely at the 
competitive real rate of interest, rt, and consequently faces a single 
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lifetime budget constraint of the form, 
00 
I (Zti - wt+jlt+j)tj = nt, j=O 
where 
Zt+ --real consumption in period t + j, 
1t+j hours worked in period t + j, 
rt, j- ( + t 1) (and 1 forj= 0), 
and 
nt =_ real wealth in period t. 
Finally, we assume that the representative consumer has a utility 
function of the form,23 
ya (1 + a)(Zt+j - W~t+j)), 
where v' > 0 and V > (. 
Under these circumstances, equilibrium in the aggregate 
market for goods and services is characterized by the following 
conditions.24 
(a) The real interest rate will always be equal to the individu- 
al's pure rate of time discount, 8:25 
rt = a. 
(b) Consumption equals output: 
zt = qt-l. 
(c) The supply of labor, denoted by S, is an increasing function 
only of the wage in the current period, wt. 
Strictly speaking, the demand for labor is the sum of the 
demands of the individual firms. However, in order to simplify the 
23. We are suppressing the role of product heterogeneity. There are several 
alternative specifications that might allow this to be brought in. 
24. That is, the utility function ensures that since the individual is willing to 
trade off a dollar of consumption at time t + 1 for 1 + i at t, regardless of the levels of 
consumption of goods or leisure, the market rate of interest must be &. 
25. Though we do not wish to argue strongly for this assumption (other than 
on grounds of analytic simplicity, and its ability to allow us to focus on the central 
issues of concern in this paper), we note that for long periods of time, there has been 
relatively little variability in real interest rates. 
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notation, we write this as 4)(q,), where qt is aggregate output and 4) 
now represents an aggregate labor requirements function. The real 
wage is then determined by an equilibrium in the labor market of 
the form, 
(19) +(qt) = s(wt), sI > 0. 
The aggregate supply of output equation is equivalent to an 
aggregate demand for labor equation, and since the aggregate 
supply function depends on the value of equity, so does the 
aggregate demand for labor equation. 
The equilibrium in the labor market is depicted in Figure V as 
the intersection of the labor demand and supply equations. Accord- 
ingly, the high sensitivity of the aggregate supply equation to 
variations in a (which itself depends on price shocks) means that 
employment and output can be highly variable. Small shocks can 
lead to large aggregate consequences. 
More formally, we solve (19) for real wages as a function of 
aggregate output of the form, 
(20) wt = *(qt), 
where ' = (4)'Is') > 0. Finally, substitution from the labor and 
capital market equilibria into the aggregate supply function yields 
a relationship of the form, 
(21) qt = g(J(qt),8,at), 
which can be solved to yield (recalling that d is a constant) 
(22) qt = H(at). 
Thus, in each period output is determined by the level of equity, and 
movements in output over time will be driven by movements in the 
level of equity (see Figure VIa). 
Note that 
dlnq dlngldlna 
dlna 1- (dlng/dlnw)(dlnwldlnq)a 
Thus, in general, the general-equilibrium volatility of output to 
changes in equity will be smaller than the partial-equilibrium 
volatility; wage adjustments help stabilize the economy. 
A. Dynamics 
Equity in period t + 1 consists of equity in period t plus 
earning on that equity plus new equity sales less dividends paid. 
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FIGURE VI 
In nominal terms, 
Al= P -+lq (1 + R')(Ptwt((q') - Al) - Ml 
where M+ 1 is a random variable representing the nominal value of 
dividends paid less new equity issued. Summation and averaging 
over firms and the taking of expected values, assuming that the law 
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FIGURE VI 
Panel A. Aggregate output increases with aggregate equity. 
Panel B. Aggregate equity at time t + 1 depends on aggregate equity at time t. 
a* is the steady state. If the economy gets perturbed, say to ao, it takes several 
periods to restore equilibrium. 
Panel C. The model can also give rise to cycles. 
of large numbers applies, yields 
At+ = E[At+1] =Pt+ qt - (Pe 1)E [ + t (wt (qt) - at) - Mt+ [ P+1 
= Pt+lqt - (Pe+1)(1 + 8)(wt((qt) - at) - Mt+, 
where unsuperscripted variables now denote aggregate quantities. 
Division by Pt+, to convert to real terms yields an equation for real 
equity levels in period t + 1 of the form, 
(23) at+, = qt - (Pe+ l/Pt+)(1 + 8)(wt((qt) - at) - mt+, 
where mt+l now denotes the real value of dividends less equity 
sales, which we assume is simply a function of the state variable 
at.26 Equations (22) and (23) together with whatever determine 
26. As noted earlier, adverse selection and signaling arguments similar to 
those used to argue that firms will not, in general, have recourse to equity markets 
have also been used to explain why dividend levels change so infrequently. For the 
short-run analysis on which this paper focuses, we can accordingly take these as 
related to the state variables of the system, in particular, to at. 
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"price shocks" (i.e., the variable Pt+lIPt~+) now completely deter- 
mines the dynamic behavior of output in the model. 
In order that this dynamic behavior be at least minimally 
interesting, the level of net equity outflows (i.e., mt+1) must be 
sufficiently large-especially at high levels of at-so that the real 
equity level in the economy does not simply increase without 
bound. We assume that m is a function of a, such that when at+i is 
plotted as a function of at (see Figure VIb), the curve must at some 
point fall below the 45-degree line (it must also at some point 
obviously lie above that line). Formally, therefore, we shall assume 
that 
(24) at+, = qt - (P'+1IPt~+)(1 + 8)(wt4(qt) - at) - m(at) 
cuts the 45-degree line from above as shown in Figure VIb.27 
B. Cycles 
Cycles (in the sense of persistent fluctuations) may occur in 
this model for two reasons. First, even with Pt+, = Pt+1 in every 
period, deterministic cycles of multiple periodicity may occur if the 
slope of the curve, 
(25) at+, = qt - (1 + 8)(wt((qt) - at) - m(at) G(at), 
is sufficiently highly negative when it crosses the 45-degree line 
(see Figure VIc).28 Since 
G = (1 + 8) - m' - ((1 + 8)(*'4+ + 4Yw) - 1)H' 
and (1 + 8)4'w < 1 (from the first-order condition of firms), this 
requires that m' be large or that the impact of increased output on 
wages (i.e., 4'4) be large. However, if these conditions are met, the 
resulting "real" cycles bear at least a casual resemblance to the 
"wage-shock" models that have been discussed, at least informally, 
in the empirical literature. Prosperity in the form of rising output 
and firm equity levels leads to both rising wages, which reduces 
profits and internal funds flows, and rising dividends. These in 
turn ultimately reduce equity levels and output, which both 
27. If we treatPt+i as a random variable, equation (24), together with equation 
(22), defines a stochastic difference equation. The limiting properties of the 
stochastic process are studied elsewhere. Here, we simply note that along each 
sample path, the property of persistence, to be described in the next subsection, will 
be observed. 
28. See Grandmont [1985] for a discussion of the mathematics of these cycles. 
We believe that the model formulated here provides a more satisfactory account of 
the structure of actual business cycles than the model of the Grandmont paper. Also 
see Woodford [1988]. 
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restores profitability (as wages fall) and reduces dividends, causing 
the cycle to begin again (see Figure VIc). 
If G' is always greater than zero, then no such cycles are 
possible and convergence to the steady state is monotone. For 
future reference, we shall denote this steady-state level of equity by 
a*, where 
(26) a* = G(a*). 
C. Persistence 
Second, random price shocks, which lead to unexpected fluctua- 
tions in the real value of debtor obligations and hence in real equity 
levels, will lead to output fluctuations that persist over several 
periods. Consider, for example, an unexpectedly low level of Pj~1 
(i.e., Pt+1 < Pe+1). From equation (24) this will lead to an immedi- 
ate and substantial drop in equity levels away from the steady-state 
level, a* (assuming that the economy started at a*), with an 
associated drop in output. The economy will return to a* (and the 
associated "full-employment" level output) only slowly as a result 
of successive positive increments to at (see Figure VIb). Moreover, 
these increments (and the associated increments in wages) will be 
fully anticipated. They may not, however, be arbitraged away nor 
the process shortcut because doing so would involve levels of 
economic activity that require firms to bear unacceptably high 
levels of risk. Firms will do this only as they acquire equity funds 
which, for information (risk) reasons, they are assumed to do only 
slowly over time. 
In the model presented in this section, while it generated 
volatility in the level of economic activity, there was (by assump- 
tion) no unemployment. In a sense, this model is very much in the 
spirit of the real business cycle literature, with one important 
distinction. Those models typically attribute economic variability 
to exogenous technology shocks. It has been difficult to identify 
changes in technology of the appropriate magnitudes to generate 
observed patterns of aggregate behavior; moreover, cross-country 
and intracountry correlations among industries make it clear that 
it is not changes in particular technologies that are driving 
economic behavior, but events within countries. 
In our model the shifts in the supply functions are a result of 
changes in perceptions, e.g., of risk, and changes in equity. Small 
disturbances can have large macroeconomic effects. 
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FIGURE VII 
Labor Market Equilibrium in a New Keynesian Model 
Equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the labor demand curve and the 
no-shirking constraint. Shocks to the economy shift the demand curve for labor, 
leading to increased unemployment. 
IV. CLOSING THE MODEL: NEW KEYNESIAN MODELS 
Like the real business cycle models, the model of the previous 
section has the unattractive feature that there is (by assumption) 
no unemployment. However, the model may easily be extended to 
incorporate unemployment. We simply substitute for the labor 
supply equation a no-shirking equation (as in Shapiro and Stiglitz 
[1984]), which specifies the wages firms must pay to elicit effort 
from workers as a function of the employment level:29 
(27) w = fl(l). 
Recognizing the dependence of 1 on q, we obtain an equation 
identical in form to (20). The rest of the analysis proceeds just as 
before. 
In Figure VII we have drawn the no-shirking constraint, and 
the equilibrium is at the intersection of the labor demand curve 
and the no-shirking constraint. Shifts in the labor demand curve 
(caused by changes in equity levels or risk perceptions) now can 
29. The no-shirking wage at time t will depend on expectations of wages and 
employment levels at future dates. For purposes of this analysis these expectations 
are being kept fixed. 
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cause marked changes in the level of unemployment, with rela- 
tively small changes in real wages. 
A. Aggregate Demand Effects 
To traditional Keynesians the model of this paper may appear 
strange: it seems to attribute all the sources of output variability to 
the supply rather than the demand side. In one sense, the paper 
can be thought of as attempting to establish the proposition that 
supply side effects, if appropriately modeled, may be able to explain 
a significant amount of the variability in economic activity, a 
proposition in accord with standard real business cycle doctrine. 
On other hand, slight extensions of the model show how 
intimately demand and supply side considerations are interwoven, 
and that the dichotomy between "demand" and "supply" side 
shocks may be, at best, misleading. 
In the model of this paper each firm only uses labor. But in 
fact, production of each commodity uses inputs from other sectors. 
Just as "equity" and "perception" shocks (whatever their sources) 
lead to decreased supply of output and decreased demand for labor, 
so too do they lead to decreased demand for the outputs of other 
firms. The demand curves these other firms face shift to the left, 
prices they receive fall, and hence, the effects of a shock to one 
sector have been transmitted to another sector, whence they can be 
retransmitted, amplified, back to the original sector. Supply re- 
sponses in one sector lead to demand disturbances in other sectors, 
which in turn lead to supply disturbances in those sectors. 
B. Investment Behavior 
Equally importantly, not only does a firm respond to equity 
and perception shocks by reducing output, labor, and inputs of 
other goods, it also reduces investment. 
One widely observed characteristic of business cycles is that 
fluctuations are disproportionately severe in the investment goods 
sectors-fixed business investment and construction, residential 
construction, consumer durables-of a typical industrial economy. 
Peak-to-trough variations in activity in these sectors are greater 
than variations in the economy as whole. This presents a puzzle for 
traditional models since, in theory at least, investment projects 
should be less intensely subject to the pressures of cyclical varia- 
tions than shorter term undertakings. If firms are risk neutral and 
on average forecast future output accurately (including a future 
recovery from the current recession), then even firms facing 
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constraints on current demand should undertake some counter- 
cyclical investment (for plausible values of the relevant cost 
curves). The costs of installation and bringing plants on line should 
be lower in slack than in tight periods; long lead times for many 
investments argue against basing projections of demand at the 
time of plant completion on current capacity levels and relatively 
small reductions in investment goods prices should be sufficient to 
shift timing decisions. Thus, the fact that investment is so strongly 
procyclical suggests that more is involved than simply a passive 
response to fluctuations in aggregate demand. The paradoxical 
nature of these investment fluctuations is compounded by the 
observation that the fluctuations often appear largest in those 
sectors where traditional arguments for fixed prices (and wages) 
appear to be weakest, e.g., home construction. 
There are at least two ways in which a simple extension of the 
model of this paper can account for these phenomena. First, 
investment goods sectors such as residential construction may for 
informational reasons (i.e., they produce highly complex goods 
with high private information content) have particularly restricted 
access to equity markets. At the same time firms in these industries 
operate with high degrees of leverage. Demand disturbances that 
reduce the equity bases of firms in these sectors will, thus, produce 
particularly large output responses. 
Second, if fixed investment is thought of as current expendi- 
tures that yield output several periods in the future, the relative 
price uncertainty surrounding these expenditures is likely to be far 
greater than that associated with expenditures on next period's 
output. As depletion of a firm's equity base requires a reduction in 
the risk that management is willing to bear, this reduction should 
fall disproportionately on the firm's riskiest activities. Hence, the 
model predicts disproportionate cyclical variations in the demand 
for investment goods. 
C. Modeling Demand and Supply Effects Simultaneously 
To see how these aggregate demand effects can easily be 
incorporated into our macro-model, we postulate that there are two 
sectors of the economy: an investment goods sector which produces 
to order, and for which, accordingly, there are no supply side 
effects; and the consumption goods sector, which we have previ- 
ously modeled. 
We postulate that the investment goods sector is competitive, 
and that its technology is described by the labor requirements 
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function p(It), with p' > 0, p" > 0. There are (at least in the short 
run) diminishing returns in the investment goods sector. Let Pt be 
the price of capital goods at time t. Then, using an analysis parallel 
to that of the first part of the paper, it is easy to show that the 
demand for new capital Itd, is given by 
(28) Id = Id(pt,Wt,8;at;Kt;x), 
where x is a vector describing firms' expectations of future values 
of the relevant variables, includingp and w, and K is the inherited 
capital stock. The demand for new capital goods depends on the 
price of capital goods, the cost of capital 8, the cost of alternative 
inputs (labor), the current capital stock, and expectations. For 
simplicity, we take expectations as given.30 Then equilibrium in the 
new capital goods market, which we assume is competitive, re- 
quires that price equal marginal cost, or 
(29) Pt = Wt(It), 
and demand equal supply. Thus, substituting (28) into (29), we 
obtain 
(30) Pt = Wt9' (Id(pt~Wta;at;Kt~x)). 
Equation (30) can, in turn, be solved forpt as a function of wt, at and 
the other variables: 
(31a) Pt = y(wt;at;8;Ktx), 
and, substituting (31a) into (28), for investment, 
(31b) I = I*(wt;at;8;Ktx). 
If we assume that the labor market is competitive, we can now 
rewrite the labor market equilibrium condition (19) as 
(32) 4+(qt) + (p(I*(wt;at;8;Kt;x)) = s(wt), 
where, it will be remembered, qt is now interpreted as the output of 
consumption goods, which depends on wages and at. This can be 
solved for wt. 
More relevant for our current purpose, with an efficiency wage 
model, we replace (32) with 
(33) 4(qt) + (p(I*(w',at;8;Kt;x)) = 0-7(wt). 
30. Though the analysis would be little affected if we made them dependent on 
the other exogenous or endogenous variables within the model. 
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The left-hand side of (33) is the aggregate demand curve for labor. 
The amount firms are willing to supply, q, and I, the amount 
firms wish to invest, depend on the same factors. Shocks to at will 
depress both qt and It, hence shifting the demand curve for labor to 
the left, and (in Figure VII) increasing the unemployment rate. 
This section has shown how bankruptcy risk can depress 
economy activity in a way quite independent from that discussed in 
earlier sections: bankruptcy risk affects the demand for investment 
as well as the supply of output. 
We now see more clearly why the dichotomy between demand 
and supply effects is somewhat misleading. Decisions to invest are 
at least partly related to decisions concerning future supply. If 
similar factors affect current and future supply, similar factors will 
affect supply and investment demand.31 
Separating out of the two, the demand and supply effects, may 
be an empirically difficult matter. Consider commercial construc- 
tion. Some of the decrease in production during a slump is due to 
builders who normally build speculatively, in anticipation of de- 
mand, decreasing their production.32 Some of the decrease in 
production is due to a decrease in demand by firms for investment 
in plant. Restoration of the equity of builders (or increasing the 
availability of credit) will have a positive supply side effect; 
restoration of the equity of firms will have a positive demand side 
effect. Improved expectations about future economic conditions 
will have positive effects on both sides. 
V. SOURCES OF SHOCKS 
This paper has stressed how, in the absence of perfect risk 
markets, shocks to the economy can be amplified, and transmitted 
from one firm or sector to another. Given our claim that relatively 
small shocks can generate large effects, there is little necessity to 
search for the basic cause of economic fluctuations: one time it may 
31. The discussion of the preceding paragraph suggested several reasons whyI 
might even be more sensitive to variations in a than is supply in the noninvestment 
goods sector. 
By assuming that investment goods are produced to order, we have greatly 
simplified the analysis, but left out of it several of the considerations we noted in 
earlier paragraphs of this subsection. In this more general model, the price of 
investment goods, qj, would be determined to equate demand and supply in the 
investment goods sector. Shocks to a shift both the demand and supply curve for 
investment to the left. We may thus see large variations in employment in the 
investment goods sector, with relatively little change in the price. 
32. Part of this decrease is due to credit rationing effects, which we have 
ignored in this paper. 
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be a monetary shock; another time an oil price shock; and another 
time a failed harvest. 
There are two basic sources of shocks in our model: price 
shocks (resulting from unanticipated shifts in the demand curve) 
and "uncertainty" shocks. 
A. Sources of Price Shocks 
There are innumerable possible ways to model the sources of 
these price shocks. The simplest is to assume that output is sold on 
a large international market and international prices vary in 
response to forces which are external to the economy in question. 
A more traditional source of such "shocks" would be a 
monetary sector that determines the aggregate price level. From 
this perspective, an unexpectedly low level of P,+1 might be 
associated either with an unexpectedly low level of money supply 
or, for some money demand specifications, with an unexpectedly 
low level of consumption demand. Explorations of these phenom- 
ena are contained in Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986], but they add 
relatively little (at the cost of some complexity) to understanding 
the basic characteristics of the model in question. 
In all cases, as in many monetary models with real effects, the 
source of the real effect is a redistribution of assets as a result of the 
"price shock." In most of these models (see, for example, Gross- 
man [1985]), the redistribution involved is a redistribution of 
wealth among households, and it is difficult to believe that such a 
redistribution would have significant macroeconomic conse- 
quences. In contrast, the redistribution that occurs in the model of 
this paper is between the equity and debt of firms. It is for practical 
purposes a redistribution between managers or owners who make 
production decisions and passive investors or lenders. Given the 
important information asymmetries, this should more readily be 
expected to have a significant impact on output. In the model the 
effects of any associated redistributions of wealth among consum- 
ers are, given the underlying assumptions on consumer behavior, 
nonexistent. 
B. Uncertainty Shocks 
The second variety of shock that might be expected to have 
persistent consequences is what might be referred to as an 
"uncertainty shock." An increase in the perceived uncertainty of 
future relative prices will, in general, lead to a reduction in the level 
of output (i.e., a downward shift in the function H(at), the output 
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supply equation (22)). If the increase in uncertainty is permanent, 
then the drop in output at each level of a will be permanent. 
However, if 
1 - (1 + 8)wt+4' - (1 + 8)4'14 < O0 
then the drop in output is associated with a simultaneous upward 
shift in the function G, the equity supply equation (25); assuming 
no change in the net dividend function m(at), lower output raises 
profitability which increases the flow of new equity (see Figure 
VIII). As G(at) shifts upward, a* increases, and there is a gradual 
adjustment to the new higher steady-state level of equity. This is 
accompanied by a slow steady, but perhaps incomplete, recovery 
from the initial drop in output. The pattern is again one of slow, 
persistent, fully anticipated recovery. 
VI. APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSION 
The formal model presented above is a model of "persistent" 
cycles in the sense that recovery from the trough of a recession 
follows an extended path involving a predictable sequence of 
positive increments to output. As noted in the introduction to this 
paper, simple extensions of the model can account for other widely 
noted cyclical phenomena. Several extensions are described in this 
section of the paper. 
/450 
Y G (a) aftershock 
G (a) before shock 
a* a** a 
FIGURE VIII 
Effect of "Uncertainty" Shocks on the Equity "Supply" Equations 
At each value of a1, at+i is increased. Equilibrium a is increased. 
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A. Inventory Fluctuations and Interfirm Interactions 
Traditional theory has found it particularly difficult to account 
for the cyclical pattern of inventory fluctuations (see Blinder 
[1986]). While firms typically accumulate excess inventories in the 
early part of a recession, they typically not only reduce inventories 
in later parts of recessions, but even reduce inventory-sales ratios. 
With traditional production models, inventories should serve as 
buffers, allowing firms to engage in production smoothing. Given 
the low levels of real interest rates, and their relative invariance 
over time, even if real wages (and other factor costs) did not vary 
much over the business cycle, one would expect inventories to move 
countercyclically; a fortiori, if shadow wages (reflecting labor 
hoarding) are lower in recessions, then inventory accumulation 
should be greater. 
Although our model, as it stands, does not directly incorporate 
inventories, a simple extension of the model offers some insight 
into the problem. Inventory accumulation early in the business 
cycle may simply reflect the desire of firms to take advantage of the 
lower marginal costs accompanying a reduction in demand. They 
do this until their asset position (achieved by converting financial 
assets into real assets in the process of inventory accumulation) so 
increases their potential exposure to financial distress that the 
process stops and, in the face of continuing shortfalls in demand, is 
reversed. This may be augmented by the effect of transfers of risk 
as the initial shock is transmitted to other firms in a vertical chain. 
B. Unemployment 
Earlier we suggested how the basic model could be extended to 
explain variations in unemployment, using the efficiency wage 
model. The model can also be used to explain why, in recessions, 
firms seem reluctant to hire new workers, even if there were no 
efficiency wage problems. 
The existence of significant hiring and training costs may 
prevent the striking of mutually acceptable wage bargains between 
unemployed workers and potential employers. In making a wage 
offer in a recession (presumably involving an extended period of 
employment), a firm will count these costs highly since the 
associated outlays will carry a high "risk" premium at a time when 
the firm's equity base is severely depleted. In order to recoup this 
"risk" cost, the firm will require a substantial saving in future 
wages in order to justify countercyclical hiring. From the perspec- 
tive of the worker, these wage sacrifices may not be justified. 
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Unless his financial position is so impaired that immediate employ- 
ment is a necessity, it may well pay the worker to attempt to 
outwait the recession. He knows that as the financial positions of 
firms improve, the effective cost to a firm of hiring and training will 
decline and wage offers will improve accordingly. Thus, the model 
provides a "waiting" motive for unemployment; in a recession a 
worker may rationally wait for an improvement in economic 
conditions (until his financial resources are depleted and he must 
accept a job). The worker could, of course, himself offer to bear 
hiring and training costs and to defer wages but there are some 
basic difficulties with this. 
First, the commitments of the firm to pay higher wages in the 
future33 may not be credible. Second, the individual in this position 
is, in effect, a supplier of a kind of equity capital: there is no fixed 
commitment to repay, even if the firm has the best of intentions. 
Thus, the usual moral hazard and adverse selection difficulties 
arise; it is precisely those firms that are in the worst financial 
position (e.g., Eastern Airlines) that will be most anxious to 
"borrow" from their employees, and offer seemingly the most 
attractive terms. 
C. Price Rigidities 
Price rigidities may arise endogenously in the model whenever 
firms are imperfect competitors. Assume that these firms face 
demand curves that are inelastic in the short run but are character- 
ized by sufficiently high long-run elasticities to restrain prices. 
Thus, raising prices increases current profits, but as customers are 
induced to search to find alternative suppliers, future profits are 
reduced. The restraint of this long-run elasticity depends on the 
rate at which future profits are discounted. As a firm's current 
equity base is depleted, the value of these uncertain future profits 
will fall relative to the immediate returns available from raising 
current prices. As a result, prices may increase despite low levels of 
current demand. And as all firms act in this way, the upward 
pressure on prices may be reinforced. In the context of empirical 
observation this may well look like downward price rigidity.34 
33. This is the flip side of the workers' inability to make commitments to accept 
low wages in the future. See Lindbeck and Snower [1989]. 
34. It should finally be noted that all these phenomena may be intensified by 
expectations cycles (see Woodford [1988]) which may be added within the frame- 
work of the basic model. 
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D. Wage Flexibility 
Traditional theory has ascribed great importance to price and 
wage rigidities, without fully or even adequately explaining the 
sources of those rigidities. 
We have already noted that sectors with more flexible prices 
are among the more volatile in the economy, which suggests that 
something beyond price and wage flexibility is at issue. Keynes too 
was skeptical about the importance of wage and price flexibility: he 
tried to argue that lowering wages might actually exacerbate the 
recession because of the induced aggregate demand effect. 
Our paper has shown that the economy can exhibit high 
volatility even with flexible wages and prices. Indeed, as for 
Keynes, but for quite different reasons, downward wage and price 
flexibility may exacerbate an economic downturn. If prices and 
wages fall (or even rise less than anticipated), equity will be 
depleted, as firms have to pay back debt at real rates higher than 
anticipated. This paper has traced out the large negative effects 
that such equity depletion has on the whole economy.35 
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper has explored the consequences of three simple, but 
we believe plausible, characteristics of the economy: (a) firms act as 
if they are equity rationed; (b) firms act as if they are averse to risk, 
to increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy; and (c) there are 
imperfect futures markets, production takes time, and inputs have 
to be paid before goods are sold. Accordingly, every production 
decision is a risky decision. 
Under these circumstances, the level and distribution of net 
worth among firms has real macroeconomic implications. The 
simple model we presented can generate cyclical behavior and can 
explain why a variety of shocks to the economy (such as price 
shocks) have persistent effects. Moreover, the theory provides a set 
of explanations for a variety of phenomena which, at best, are 
difficult to explain within the traditional neoclassical paradigm. 
Most notably, while in the traditional model, investment, particu- 
35. Elsewhere [Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990] we model the banking sector, the 
effect of price declines on that sector, and the effect of that sector on the rest of the 
economy. Lower than anticipated prices represent a redistribution from firms to 
lenders, which, in many cases, are banks; at the same time higher rates of 
bankruptcy both increase their perception of risk and deplete bank's equity supply; 
both of these effects lead to reduced lending behavior. 
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larly in inventories, should have a smoothing effect, dampening 
fluctuations in demand, the variability of investment seems to 
contribute to these fluctuations. Such fluctuations could only be 
consistent with plausible assumptions concerning technology (ad- 
justment costs, etc.) if the cyclical movements were accompanied 
by greater variations in real interest rates and movements in 
(shadow) real wages than are in fact observed. While Keynes was 
willing to let Animal Spirits serve as the deus ex machina to 
retrieve an explanation of investment variability, our theory 
provides a more plausible explanation of variability in investment, 
or at least one that is more consistent with currently fashionable 
strictures on hypotheses concerning expectation formation. 
We have noted too that traditional theory failed to provide a 
rationale for price (and wage) rigidity and, while ascribing consider- 
able importance to these rigidities, failed to explain why output 
fluctuations were greater in the seemingly flexible price sectors. 
Our theory provides a rationale for price rigidities and an explana- 
tion for why sectors with flexible prices (e.g., residential construc- 
tion) may suffer greater output variability. 
Our model provides an explanation of another long-standing 
conundrum in economics. Keynes argued that firms should be on 
their supply functions, and that accordingly, when output was 
reduced, real wages should increase. Real wages do not increase to 
the extent that standard production function models would have 
predicted. The resolution provided by much of the recent (fixed- 
price) literature, that firms are demand constrained (just as in the 
labor market, workers are demand constrained), is not totally 
plausible: why in a competitive environment should firms that are 
able to solve the complex production problems which these models 
postulate that they can, not be able to discover that by lowering 
their prices, they could steal customers away from their rivals and 
hence increase their profits? 
The explanation provided by our model is that firms may, 
indeed, be on their supply function; but that the supply function 
has shifted to the left, not because of the disappearance of capital, 
but because of increases in uncertainty and changes in the 
distribution of firm equity. 
While our model suggests that wage and price flexibility may 
exacerbate the problems of an economy facing a downturn, it 
suggests that other government policies to stabilize the economy 
may be less effective than a partial-equilibrium model might 
suggest. Stabler environments induce firms to take more risks, 
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making them and the economy more vulnerable to shocks. But the 
welfare gains from such stabilization measures are to be measured 
not just by the reduced volatility of the economy, but by the 
increased output (productivity, investment) which (at any level of 
firm equity) the firm undertakes. 
Macroeconomic phenomena-unemployment, the variability 
in output and investment, the lack of variability in wages and 
prices-are complex. No single model, or even a simple set of 
explanations, is likely to inform us concerning all of its important 
aspects. 
In this paper we have argued that understanding capital 
markets, the constraints that imperfect information imposes on 
the ability of individuals to divest themselves of risk, is essential to 
understanding certain aspects of macroeconomic behavior. Other 
informational problems and the constraints to which they give rise, 
including credit rationing, are, we would argue, essential to 
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